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Abstract
The EU dairy sector will be one of the most sensitive sectors to be affected by the
outcome of the on-going negotiations for the new WTO round for agriculture. Nevertheless, if
the Next WTO Round is going to be along the same lines as the Uruguay Round, the EU may
be able to stay within the WTO commitments for export subsidy in the dairy sector without
further reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy. Certainly, some minor reforms are
needed to relieve the binding commitments for cheese and other milk products. The up-
coming reform in the dairy sector under Agenda 2000 starting from year 2005 may help in
reforming the dairy sector for the new round. In contrast, a steeper reduction in the export
subsidy commitments compared to the Uruguay Round may cause problems for cheese and
other milk products because the majority of exports in these products will have to be exported
without any export subsidy. After enlargement, in particular with a steeper reduction formula,
the EU may face troubles in the categories of butter, skim milk powder, cheese, and other
milk products. The reforms under Agenda 2000 may not be sufficient because the difference
between the EU internal market price and world market price is still too high for EU dairy
products to allow unsubsidised exports to the world market. The EU internal market will have
to absorb the dairy products intended for the export market. Consequently, the EU internal
market for dairy products will be under pressure for further price reduction, and the EU world
market share in dairy products will shrink.
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1. Introduction
Trade in agriculture is governed by rules under the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA) for 144 members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The
Uruguay Round fundamentally changed the rules for international agricultural trade, whereby
quantitative constraints for agricultural policies were established for all WTO members. The
URAA began on the 1st of July 1995 and concluded on the 30th of June 2001, implemented
over a period of six years. Global agricultural commitments imposed by the WTO are divided
into four key areas: export competition, market access, domestic support and the so-called
non-trade concerns. These commitments will remain at year 2001 level with no further
reductions in commitments before the introduction of a new WTO round for agriculture.
Negotiations on further liberalisation in agricultural trade were launched at the WTO in
March 2000. Member countries of the WTO have agreed to continue the ongoing agricultural
negotiations on the basis of Article 20 of the URAA. Negotiating proposals were submitted
by member countries to the WTO, paving the way for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
that was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The launching of the Doha Development
Agenda and future negotiations will influence the shape and dynamics of the comprehensive
trade round. The next WTO Ministerial Conference will be held in Mexico in year 2003.
Different interest groups in the WTO have diverse proposals for the future agreement on
agriculture. For instance, the Cairns Group has proposed for phased elimination of export
subsidies and trade distorting support payments with a 50 percent reduction in the first
implementation year of the Next WTO Round. On the other hand, the EU has proposed that
tariff and farm subsidy cuts to be along the same lines as in the Uruguay Round. The outcome
for the rules in the Next WTO Round is uncertain until the 1
st of January 2005, which is the
deadline set for the completion of the WTO negotiations for the comprehensive trade round.2
During the WTO Ministerial in Doha, the WTO members declared to “commit
themselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market
access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and
substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.” The EU will encounter further
reductions in the export subsidy commitments in the new forth-coming WTO round for
agriculture.
Until 1995, the EU had been able to increase its world market share of dairy products by
means of export subsidies. The URAA export subsidy commitments put an end to the EU’s
policy of gaining market share through export subsidies. With further reductions in export
subsidy or the eventual phasing out of export subsidies, the EU may lose market share in the
world market for dairy products. In the future, the EU may not be able to use export subsidies
as a tool for getting rid of surplus production in the EU dairy sector. As a consequence, the
EU internal prices for dairy products will be directly under pressure when there is an
oversupply situation in the EU internal market or a slump in the world dairy market.
The main focus of this research is to study the impacts of further reductions in export
subsidy commitments on the EU dairy sector. In addition, by including the ten Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries, the impacts of the prospective EU enlargement are
assessed according to the different degrees of reduction in the export subsidy commitments.
2. Methodology
Two different scenarios are shown in the projections for the Next WTO Round. In the
first scenario, the reduction in commitments for the Next WTO Round is assumed to be along
the same lines as in the Uruguay Round with further 36 percent reduction in export subsidy
expenditure and 21 percent reduction in the volume of subsidised export. In the second
scenario, the reduction in commitments are projected with further 50 percent reduction in
export subsidy expenditure and 50 percent reduction in the volume of subsidised export. The
base year for reduction in commitments is 2004/2005, which is a continuance of the Uruguay
Round’s level in marketing year 2000/2001. The on-going WTO negotiation process is
assumed to be completed by January 2005. Thus, the Next WTO Round is assumed to begin
in marketing year 2005/2006 and end in marketing year 2010/2011 over a six-year
implementation period.
The EU notifications to the WTO are used as a base for the export subsidy projections
(WTO Notifications). The EU-15 total export figures for dairy products are based on
projections from European Commission’s “Prospects for Agricultural Markets 2001-2008.”
The percentages of subsidisation (percentage share of subsidised export quantities from total
exports) for EU dairy exports are based on the average levels of subsidised EU dairy exports
during the Uruguay Round over a period of six years (Appendix 1). Average subsidy per ton
(Appendix 2) is used for the projection of the actual export subsidy expenditure (average
subsidy per ton multiplied by the total subsidised exports).
Under the EU enlargement scenarios, it is assumed that ten new member states should
be ready to join the EU by year 2004 with the “big bang effect.” The new member states
consist of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, and Romania. It is assumed that EU membership does not affect the agricultural
production and exports of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. It is also
assumed that production quotas will be imposed on milk production in the CEE countries.
The production quotas will correspond to the 1999 production level for milk in the CEE
countries. The CEE-10 countries’ total export figures for dairy products are based on FAPRI
(2000) projections. In the EU-25 projections, the CEE-10 countries’ net exports are added to
the EU-15 member states’ total exports. Intra-trade within the CEE countries (UNCTAD
TRAINS) and intra-trade between the CEE countries and EU-15 member states (EUROSTAT
COMEXT) are excluded from the CEE countries’ net exports calculations for EU-25 exports.3
3. Export subsidy projection for EU-15 dairy sector
The export subsidy commitments for EU’s dairy products are divided into four different
categories rather than as a single product grouping: butter & butteroil, skim milk powder
(SMP), cheese, and other milk products. During the Uruguay Round, the quantity
commitments for subsidised export was reduced by 21 percent and the budgetary
commitments for export subsidy was reduced by 36 percent over a period of six years.
In this study, further reductions in the export subsidy commitments are projected in two
different scenarios for each product category. In the first scenario, the EU-15 export subsidy
commitments in the Next WTO Round are projected with further 21 percent reduction in the
quantity commitments and 36 percent reduction in the budgetary commitments, whereas the
second scenario has projections of further 50 percent reduction in both the budgetary and
quantity commitments. Similar to the Uruguay Round, the new round is assumed to be
implemented over a period of six years.
3.1 Butter & butteroil
During the Uruguay Round, both the quantity and budgetary commitments for export
subsidy were not binding for butter (Graph 1 and 2). There was a huge slack in the export
subsidy commitments for butter because high base-years were used for the calculations of the
base year commitments compared to the actual lower exportable surpluses of butter during the
Uruguay Round.
Under Scenario 1, both the quantity and budgetary commitments for export subsidy will
not be binding for butter in the Next WTO Round (Graph 1 and 2). The slack in the export
subsidy commitments for butter during the Uruguay Round will carry on to the Next WTO
Round even though 100 percent of butter is exported with export subsidy.
Under Scenario 2, the export subsidy commitments for butter will be binding by the end
of the Next WTO Round, and the quantity commitments will be more binding compared to
the budgetary commitments (Graph 1 and 2). Under this scenario, the EU will still be able to
stay within the export subsidy commitments for butter in the Next WTO Round even though
all butter exports is subsidised.
3.2 Skim milk powder
The quantity and budgetary commitments for export subsidy were not binding for skim
milk powder at the beginning of the Uruguay Round (Graph 3 and 4). However, the export
subsidy commitments were breach in marketing year 1999/2000 because the EU was taking
advantage of the “roll-over” feature allowed for under utilised commitments in order to empty
the storage of skim milk powder accumulated from intervention buying. In stark contrast, the
final marketing year 2000/2001 actual subsidised export quantity and expenditure for export
subsidy were well below the export subsidy commitments due to the weak Euro and high
demand in the world market.
Under Scenario 1, the quantity commitments for export subsidy will be very binding for
skim milk powder by the end of the Next WTO Round compared to the budgetary
commitments (Graph 3 and 4). Under this scenario, the EU is able to stay within the export
subsidy commitments for skim milk powder, whereby 10 percent of skim milk powder is
exported without any export subsidy.
Under Scenario 2, the quantity commitments for export subsidy will be breached for
skim milk powder, if 90 percent of exports in skim milk powder is still subsidised in the Next
WTO Round (Graph 3 and 4). However, the EU will be able to stay within the budgetary
commitments for export subsidy in the Next WTO Round if the average subsidy per ton is
near EUR 626. In order to stay within the quantity commitments for export subsidy, only 604
percent of skim milk powder exports can be subsidised by the end of the Next WTO Round.
In other words, the EU is able to stay within the export subsidy commitments for skim milk
powder, if 40 percent of skim milk powder is exported without any export subsidy.
3.3 Cheese
During the Uruguay Round, the quantity commitments for export subsidy were binding
for cheese compared to the budgetary commitments. Both the actual subsidised exports
quantity and expenditure in export subsidy were declining at the beginning, but changed to an
increasing trend by the end of the Uruguay Round (Graph 5 and 6). The EU had been utilising
the “inward processing system” in order to circumvent the binding quantity commitments for
cheese (Huan-Niemi & Niemi).
Under Scenario 1, both the quantity and budgetary commitments in export subsidy for
cheese will be breached in the Next WTO Round, if 76 percent of cheese is still exported with
export subsidy (Graph 5 and 6). In order to stay within the export subsidy commitments, only
50 percent of cheese exports can be subsidised by the end of the Next WTO Round, and the
average subsidy per ton is near EUR 745. Thus, the EU is able to stay within the export
subsidy commitments for cheese, if half of cheese exports is not subsidised.
Under Scenario 2, the breach in the export subsidy commitments will be more acute
compared to Scenario 1 in the Next WTO Round, if 76 percent of exports in cheese is still
subsidised (Graph 5 and 6). In order to stay within the export subsidy commitments, the EU
can export only 35 percent of cheese with export subsidy by the end of the Next WTO Round,
but the average subsidy per ton can remain at EUR 745. Subsequently, the EU is able to stay
within the export subsidy commitments for cheese, if 65 percent of cheese is exported without
any export subsidy.
3.4 Other milk products
The quantity commitments in export subsidy for other milk products (includes fresh
milk, whole milk powder, condensed milk, casein, yoghurt, etc) had been extremely binding
during the entire span of the Uruguay Round (Graph 7 and 8). The export subsidy
commitments were even breached in some years, but the “roll-over” feature for under utilised
commitments during earlier years allowed the violation. By the final marketing year
2000/2001, the EU was able to stay within the export subsidy commitments for other milk
products, whereas the actual expenditure in export subsidy was well below the budgetary
commitment due to the weak Euro and improved demand in the world market.
Under Scenario 1, both the quantity and budgetary commitments in export subsidy for
other milk products will be severely breached in the Next WTO Round, if 83 percent of other
milk products is still exported with export subsidy (Graph 7 and 8). In order to stay within the
export subsidy commitments, only 60 percent of exports in other milk products can be
subsidised by the end of the Next WTO Round, and the average subsidy per ton has to be
below EUR 673 (around EUR 580). So, the EU is able to stay within the export subsidy
commitments for other milk products, if 40 percent of exports in other milk products is not
subsidised and the average subsidy per ton is near EUR 580.
Under Scenario 2, the breach is more serious compared to Scenario 1 for both the
quantity and budgetary commitments in export subsidy for other milk products, if 83 percent
of other milk products is still subsidised in the Next WTO Round (Graph 7 and 8). In order to
stay within the export subsidy commitments, the EU can export only 35 percent of other milk
products with export subsidy by the end of the Next WTO Round and the average subsidy per
ton will stay around EUR 673. Therefore, the EU is able to stay within the export subsidy
commitments for other milk products, if two-thirds of other milk products are exported
without export subsidy.5
(1)  Butter Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2)  Butter Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised butter exports (subsidised exports quantity = 100% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1)  Butter Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2)  Butter Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3)  Average subsidy per ton for butter (1791 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised butter exports (subsidised exports = 100% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
 Graph 1. EU-15 Butter: Export Subsidy Quantity Commitments 
Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections


































Butter Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections
Butter Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 2. EU-15 Butter: Export Subsidy Budgetary Commitments 
Versus Actual Expenditure Projections 








































Butter Budgetary Commitments (1)
Butter Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 1791 euro/ton (3)
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%6
(1) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised SMP exports (subsidised exports quantity = 90% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1)  Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2)  Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3)  Average subsidy per ton for SMP (626 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised SMP exports (subsidised exports = 90% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
Graph 3. EU-15 Skim Milk Powder: Export Subsidy Quantity 
Commitments Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections

































Skim Milk Powder Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections
Skim Milk Powder Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 4. EU-15 Skim Milk Powder: Export Subsidy Budgetary 
Commitments Versus Actual Expenditure Projections 





































Skim Milk Powder Budgetary Commitments (1)
Skim Milk Powder Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 626 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 20017
(1) Cheese Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Cheese Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised cheese exports (subsidised exports quantity = 76% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1) Cheese Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2) Cheese Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3) Average subsidy per ton for cheese (745 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised cheese exports (subsidised exports = 76% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
Graph 5. EU-15 Cheese: Export Subsidy Quantity Commitments 
Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections

































Cheese Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections 
Cheese Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 6. EU-15 Cheese: Export Subsidy Budgetary Commitments 
Versus Actual Expenditure Projections





































Cheese Budgetary Commitments (1)
Cheese Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 745 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 20018
(1) Other Milk Products (OMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Other Milk Products (OMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised OMP exports (subsidised exports quantity = 83% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1) Other Milk Products (OMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2) Other Milk Products (OMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3) Average subsidy per ton for OMP (673 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised OMP exports (subsidised exports = 83% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
Graph 7. EU-15 Other Milk Products: Export Subsidy Quantity 
Commitments Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections 

































Other Milk Products Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections
Other Milk Products Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 8. EU-15 Other Milk Products: Export Subsidy Budgetary 
Commitments Versus Actual Expenditure Projections 





































Other Milk Products Budgetary Commitments (1)
Other Milk Products Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 673 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 20019
4. EU enlargement: export subsidy projection for EU-25 dairy sector
Under EU enlargement, it is assumed that ten new member states will be ready to join
the EU by marketing year 2004/2005 with the “big bang effect” and the new WTO round will
begin in 2005/2006. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania are members of the WTO. Therefore, these countries are
also subjected to the reduction commitments under the URAA. These countries export
subsidy commitments for dairy products are differently categorised compared to the EU.
Moreover, each country has different classification of export subsidy commitments for dairy
products (Appendix 3). As a result, the following assumptions are made for the EU-25 export
subsidy projections in dairy products:
1.  It is assumed that the export subsidy commitments in the category of “Milk Powder”
under the CEE countries will be combined with the export subsidy commitments in
the category of “Skim Milk Powder” under the EU.
2.  It is assumed that the export subsidy commitments in the category of “Cheese,”
“Other Milk Products,” “Dairy Products,” and “Butter” will be combined with the
export subsidy commitments in the category of “Cheese” under the EU. The EU
already has excess export subsidy commitments for “Butter,” whereas “Other Milk
Products” is a combination of many dairy products that make it impossible to do
projections for this category. Because “Cheese” will be considered the most
strategic or competitive product among the dairy products in the future, the rest of
the export subsidy commitments are channelled towards the category of  “Cheese”
under the EU-25 projections.
3.  It is assumed that the EU will receive directly all the export subsidy commitments
for dairy products from the CEE countries, once these countries attain membership
in the EU. In the EU-25 projections, the export subsidy commitments for dairy
products will be classified in the same way as the EU-15 categories for dairy
products.
Similar to the EU-15 projections, further reductions in the export subsidy commitments
are also projected in two different scenarios for each product category. In the first scenario,
the EU- 25 export subsidy commitments in the Next WTO Round are projected with further
21 percent reduction in the quantity commitments and 36 percent reduction in the budgetary
commitments. The second scenario has projections of further 50 percent reduction in both the
budgetary and quantity commitments. Parallel to the Uruguay Round, the new round is
assumed to be implemented over a period of six years.
4.1 Butter & butteroil
Under Scenario 1, the EU-25 projections in the Next WTO Round indicate that the
export subsidy commitments for both quantity and expenditure will not be binding even
though the CEE countries do not bring in any extra export subsidy commitments for butter
(Graph 9 and 10). There will be some slack in the export subsidy commitments for butter
even though the net exports of butter from the CEE countries are included. Under this EU
enlargement scenario, the slack in the export subsidy commitments for butter during the
Uruguay Round will continue to the Next WTO Round.
Under Scenario 2, the EU-25 projections indicate that the quantity commitments for
export subsidy will be breached by the end of the Next WTO Round, but the budgetary
commitments will not be breached (Graph 9 and 10). In order to stay within the export
subsidy commitments, only 80 percent of butter exports can be subsidised in the Next WTO
Round, and the average subsidy per ton is near EUR 1791. Under this EU enlargement10
scenario, the slack in the export subsidy commitments for butter during the Uruguay Round
will not be enough to cover the additional net exports for butter (without additional export
subsidy commitments for butter) from the CEE countries by the end of the Next WTO Round.
4.2 Skim milk powder
Under Scenario 1, the EU-25 projections for skim milk powder indicate that the
quantity commitments for export subsidy will be slightly breached by the end of the Next
WTO Round, if 90 percent of skim milk powder is still exported with export subsidy. Though,
the budgetary commitments for skim milk powder will not be breached, if the average subsidy
per ton is around EUR 626 (Graph 11 and 12). In order to stay within the quantity
commitments for export subsidy, about 80 percent of skim milk powder can be exported with
export subsidy by the end of the Next WTO Round. Under this EU enlargement scenario, the
export subsidy commitments brought in by the CEE countries are insufficient to cover the net
exports of skim milk powder from the CEE countries. As a result, about 20 percent of skim
milk powder need to be exported without export subsidy by the end of the Next WTO Round
compared to 10 percent under the EU-15 scenario.
Under Scenario 2, the EU-25 projections indicate that both the quantity and budgetary
commitments for export subsidy will be breached, if 90 percent of exports in skim milk
powder is still subsidised in the Next WTO Round (Graph 11 and 12). In order to stay within
the export subsidy commitments, about 50 percent of skim milk powder exports can be
subsidised and the average subsidy per ton can remain around EUR 626. Under this EU
enlargement scenario, about half of skim milk powder exports cannot be subsidised by the
end of the Next WTO Round.
4.3 Cheese
Under Scenario 1, the EU-25 projections for cheese indicate that both the quantity and
budgetary commitments for export subsidy will be breached by the end of the Next WTO
Round, if 76 percent of cheese is still exported with export subsidy (Graph 13 and 14). In
order to stay within the export subsidy commitments, 65 percent of cheese exports can be
subsidised by the end of the Next WTO Round and the average subsidy per ton is around
EUR 745. Under this EU enlargement scenario, the export subsidy commitments brought in
by the CEE countries exceed the net exports of cheese from the CEE countries. The main
reason is that the CEE countries’ export subsidy commitments in the category of “cheese,”
“other milk products,” “dairy products,” and “butter” are channelled towards the category of
“cheese” under the EU-25 projections. Thus, only 35 percent of cheese exports need to be
exported without any export subsidy compared to 50 percent of exports in cheese under the
EU-15 scenario.
Under Scenario 2, the EU-25 projections in the Next WTO Round indicate that the
breach in the export subsidy commitments will be more severe compared to Scenario 1, if 76
percent of exports in cheese is still subsidised (Graph 13 and 14). In order to stay within the
export subsidy commitments, only 40 percent of cheese exports can be subsidised by the end
of the Next WTO Round and the average subsidy per ton can remain around EUR 745. Under
this EU enlargement scenario, 60 percent of cheese exports will have to be exported without
any export subsidy compared to 65 percent of cheese exports under the EU-15 scenario. The
“surplus” export subsidy commitments from the CEE countries have a smaller impact here
because this scenario has a steeper reduction formula compared to Scenario 1.11
(1) Butter Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Butter Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised butter exports (subsidised exports quantity = 100% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1) Butter Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2) Butter Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3) Average subsidy per ton for butter (1791 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised butter exports (subsidised exports = 100% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
 Graph 9. EU-25 Butter: Export Subsidy Quantity Commitments 
Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections





































Butter Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections
Butter Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 10. EU-25 Butter: Export Subsidy Budgetary Commitments 
Versus Actual Expenditure Projections 








































Butter Budgetary Commitments (1)
Butter Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 1791 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 200112
(1) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised SMP exports (subsidised exports quantity = 90% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2) Skim Milk Powder (SMP) Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3) Average subsidy per ton for SMP (626 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised SMP exports (subsidised exports = 90% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
Graph 11. EU-25 Skim Milk Powder: Export Subsidy Quantity 
Commitments Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections

































Skim Milk Powder Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections
Skim Milk Powder Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 12. EU-25 Skim Milk Powder: Export Subsidy Budgetary 
Commitments Versus Actual Expenditure Projections 





































Skim Milk Powder Budgetary Commitments (1)
Skim Milk Powder Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 626 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 200113
(1) Cheese Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 21%
(2) Cheese Quantity Commitments are further reduced by 50%
p: projections of subsidised cheese exports (subsidised exports quantity = 76% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
(1) Cheese Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 36%
(2) Cheese Budgetary Commitments are further reduced by 50%
(3) Average subsidy per ton for cheese (745 Euro) is used for the actual export subsidy expenditure projections
p: projections of expenditure for subsidised cheese exports (subsidised exports = 76% of total exports)
Source: CEC 2001, FAPRI 2000, FAOSTAT 2000, EUROSTAT COMEXT, UNCTAD TRAINS,
WTO Notifications, Huan-Niemi & Niemi 2001
Graph 13. EU-25 Cheese: Export Subsidy Quantity Commitments 
Versus Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections


































Cheese Quantity Commitments (1) Subsidised Exports Quantity Projections 
Cheese Quantity Commitments (2)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 21%
Scenario (2) reduction of 50%
Uruguay Round:
1995 to 2001
Graph 14. EU-25 Cheese: Export Subsidy Budgetary Commitments 
Versus Actual Expenditure Projections





































Cheese Budgetary Commitments (1)
Cheese Budgetary Commitments (2)
Actual Export Subsidy Expenditure Projections  -- average subsidy = 745 euro/ton (3)
New Round in 2005/2006:
Scenario (1) reduction of 36%




The EU will undoubtedly face further reductions in the export subsidy commitments in
the new forth-coming WTO round for agriculture. It is just a matter of what kind of reduction
formula that will apply due to the outcome of the current negotiations scheduled to end in the
1
st of January 2005. There is a possibility that the new round will be along the same lines as
the Uruguay Round, but steeper reductions in the export subsidy commitments can also be a
probable outcome.
In both the EU-15 and EU-25 projections, the EU may be able to stay within the WTO
commitments for export subsidy in the dairy sector without further reforms in the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), if the Next WTO Round is going to be along the same lines as the
Uruguay Round. However, some minor reforms are needed to relieve the binding
commitments for cheese and other milk products. The up-coming reform in the dairy sector
under Agenda 2000 starting from year 2005 may help in reforming the dairy sector for the
new round. In contrast, a steeper reduction in the export subsidy commitments compared to
the Uruguay Round may cause problems for cheese and other milk products because the
majority of exports in these products will have to be exported without any export subsidy. The
enlarged EU may face troubles in butter, skim milk powder, cheese, and other milk products
with a steeper reduction formula. The reforms under Agenda 2000 may not be sufficient
because the difference between the EU internal market price and world market price is still
too high for dairy products to allow unsubsidised exports to the world market. The EU
internal market will have to absorb the dairy products intended for the export market.
Consequently, the EU internal market for dairy products will be under pressure for further
price reduction, and the EU world market share in dairy products will shrink.
The demand for dairy products in the world market and the strength of the Euro are
directly influencing the amount of subsidised exports in dairy products from the EU. A strong
demand in the world market combined with a weak Euro will give the EU a great deal of
“breathing space” in the export subsidy commitments. Marketing year 2000/2001 was the
prove of this occurrence, in which the actual expenditure for the dairy sector under the CAP
budget was under spent by about EUR 457 million.
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1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 Average
DAIRY PRODUCT
BUTTER 115 % 107 % 102 % 110 % 120 % 107 % 110 %
SKIM MILK POWDER 97 % 99 % 77 % 111 % 120 % 36 % 90 %
CHEESE 82 % 82 % 77 % 70 % 81 % 67 % 76 %
OTHER MILK PRODUCTS 89 % 84 % 87 % 82 % 87 % 69 % 83 %
CEEC Export Subsidy Commitments for Dairy Products by the end of the URAA
Poland Milk Powder (37 000 tons)
Hungary Dairy Products (7 700 tons)
Czech Milk Powder (66 900 tons) and Other Milk Products (62 800 tons)
Slovenia no export subsidy commitments
Estonia no export subsidy commitments
Latvia no export subsidy commitments
Lithuania no export subsidy commitments
Slovakia Milk Powder (15 000 tons) and Other Milk Products (7 100 tons)
Bulgaria Cheese (5 000 tons)
Romania Butter (14 800 tons) and Cheese (11 400 tons)
AVERAGE SUBSIDY PER TON
(in Euro/ton)
6 years
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 Average
DAIRY PRODUCT
BUTTER 1750 1999 1837 1728 1719 1713 1791
SKIM MILK POWDER 584 631 663 865 810 205 626
CHEESE 1036 675 543 659 773 781 745
OTHER MILK PRODUCTS 629 642 677 798 820 470 673